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According to a research conducted by Anis Baswedan, Saiful Mujani and R. 
Will- iam Liddle, political Islam in Indonesia during the post Reformation had a 
mod- erate and pluralistic character. But this qualitative case study finds that 
a new phenomenon of polarization based on religious identities emerges 
among vot- ers in the elections. In this article we argue that the results of the 
second round of the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election provide strong 
evidence that sup- ports the idea of ideological polarization. We apply the 
root cause model presented by Veldhuis and Staun to understand how Islamic 
radicalization occurs in the Jakarta election. In line with the argument of 
Mainwaring and Torcal, we also argue that due to weak institutionalization, 
political parties did not play a dominant role in shaping the sharp ideological 
gap among voters. Rather it was the product of a successful campaign and 
political spin by alliances of Islamic organizations and politicians that 
exploited the issue of Islamic identity to out- perform other contestants with 
different religious identity. We found that polarization of identity based on 
religiosity occurred due to social dynamics that were manufactured by 
campaign strategies and staff, politicians, and religious leaders. Political 
marketing strategies in the event of elections have, in fact, blatantly exploited 
the issue of religion as a political weapon in elections. It has led to the 
resurgence of religious identity in entering the political debate. Hence growing 
intolerance and conflicts based on religious identities during elections may have 
provided initial evidence to support the idea that Indonesian democracy is pro- 
gressing towards illiberal democracy. 
Keywords: polarization, religious identity, Islamic radicalization, intolerance, po- 
litical marketing strategy 
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dan R. William Liddle, Politik Islam di Indonesia selama masa Reformasi memiliki karakter 
moderat dan pluralistik. Namun, studi kasus kualitatif ini menemukan bahwa fenomena 
polarisasi baru berdasarkan identitas keagamaan muncul di antara para pemilih dalam 
pemilihan. Dalam artikel ini kami berpendapat bahwa hasil putaran kedua Pemilu Gubernur 
DKI Jakarta 2017 memberikan bukti kuat yang mendukung gagasan polarisasi ideologis. 
Kami menerapkan model akar permasalahan yang diajukan oleh Veldhuis dan Staun untuk 
memahami bagaimana radikalisasi Islam terjadi dalam pemilihan di DKI Jakarta. Sejalan 
    dengan argumen Mainwaring dan Torcal, kami juga berpendapat bahwa karena 
pelembagaan yang lemah, partai politik tidak memainkan peran dominan dalam 
membentuk kesenjangan ideologis yang tajam di antara para pemilih. Melainkan 
merupakan produk dari kampanye dan spin politik yang sukses oleh aliansi organisasi dan 
politisi Islam yang mengeksploitasi isu identitas Islam untuk mengungguli kontestan lain 
dengan identitas agama yang berbeda. Kami menemukan bahwa polarisasi identitas 
berdasarkan religiusitas terjadi karena dinamika sosial yang dihasilkan oleh strategi 
kampanye staf, politisi, dan pemuka agama. Strategi pemasaran politik dalam hal pemilihan 
umum, pada kenyataannya, dengan terang-terangan mengeksploitasi isu agama sebagai 
senjata politik dalam pemilihan. Hal ini menyebabkan bangkitnya identitas religius dalam 
memasuki perdebatan politik. Oleh karena itu, meningkatnya intoleransi dan konflik 
berdasarkan identitas keagamaan selama pemilihan mungkin telah memberikan bukti 
awal untuk mendukung gagasan bahwa demokrasi Indonesia berkembang menuju 
demokrasi yang tidak liberal. 




This study is inspired by the landslide victory of election chal- 
lenging duo Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno over the 
incum- bent governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja 
Purnama,along with Djarot Saiful Hidayat, in the second 
round of the 2017th guberna- torial election. The official results 
released by the Jakarta Elec- tion Commission (KPU DKI) 
during the second round of the election showed that Anies 
Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno won the election with a total of 
3,240,987 votes, equal to 57.96%, while Anies Baswedan and 
Sandiaga Uno secured 2,350,366 votes, equal to 42.04%. An 
intense campaign strategy among candidates of the Jakarta 
gubernatorial election that lasted for two rounds of voting 
attracted the public not only within the capital area of Jakarta 
but also nationwide. It provided numerous topics of po- litical 
debate among social scientists, political analysts, and TV 
commentators, especially when we looked at the programs and 
strategies of every candidate, which were very intensive, 





Every candidate managed to apply the strategy of blusukan 
(impromptu visits) to portray aspirations from the public, by in- 
cluding them in the program that had been planned to convince 
the voters of Jakarta. Unquestionably this model of campaign 
has an essential rationale underpinning it, especially when we 
compare it to the theory of political marketing that states that 
each campaign program should be constructed based on market 
surveys (Marshment, 2011). The decision to apply the “im- 
promptu-visits” campaign model came about as a result of a 
market survey that stated that the majority of the public 
wanted a populist leader who would be able to grasp the 
aspirations of the low- and middle-class society. However, the use 
of campaign strategies that were nearly identical to each other 
created a condition in which the creativity of all campaign 
advisors and staff in applying their strategy would undoubtedly 
determine the outcome of the election. 
This paper is based on some anomalies that emerged in the 
Jakarta gubernatorial election that contradicted the elections in 
other regions. One of them was that the Jakarta gubernatorial 
election marked an increase in voter turnout, with the second 
round turnout being 77.8% compared to the first round of only 
75 percent. This has rarely happened in other regional and local 
elections in Indonesia because the second round elections have 
usually resulted in a decrease in voter turnout. 
In this research, we will focus on two fundamental anomalies 
that we considered to be vital in the case of the Jakarta guberna- 
torial election. First, according to many political analysts the fea- 
ture of political Islam during the post-reformation era has been 
characterized as plural and moderate. For example, when we 
parallel it to the writing of Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga 
Uno, one of the main candidates in the election, his studies 
(2004) concluded that the characteristics of political Islam in 
Indonesia, after the reformation era, reflect the diversity and 
pragmatism of Muslim aspirations. Political Islam was not only 























logical platform but it was also taken over by political parties 
that were hospitable towards Muslim aspirations, including po- 
litical parties with nationalist ideologies. Politics in the name of 
Islam has been actuated by almost all political parties ranging 
from the Islamist parties to Islamic-friendly parties and secular- 
inclusive parties (Baswedan, 2004). 
What has been prevalent in the post-reformation era of Indo- 
nesia is the rise of catch-all parties, a species of parties with ten- 
dencies to be pivotal centerist parties (Mietzner, 2008). Mietzner 
is in line with Green-Pedersen, who has learned from the con- 
text of centripetal parties in Europe to argue that the existence 
of pivotal center parties has pulled other parties with extreme 
ideologies into the center of the political spectrum. To prove his 
argument, Mietzner provides data from Muslim parties in Indo- 
nesia. He argues that most Muslim parties in Indonesia have 
been moderate and pragmatic, with an orientation towards gain- 
ing seats in the cabinet, which made them move into the center 
of the political spectrum. Another example of a moderate and 
pragmatic party exists today in the period after the 2014 general 
election, manifested in the form of the Democratic Party under 
the direction of former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. 
After their bad performance in the 2014 general election, with 
the decline of their percentage of the vote, the Democratic Party 
maintained their policy of not joining the cabinet of President 
Jokowi while also not becoming include in the major opposi- 
tion coalition. 
However, in the midst of the current trend of moderate and 
pragmatic political parties during the post-reformation era, this 
article presents contrasting facts that arose from the 2017 Jakarta 
Gubernatorial election. We argue that the second round of the 
Jakarta election brought about a surprise that actually supports 
Sartori’s argument regarding ideological polarization (Sartori, 
1976). Campaign strategies and staff exploited religious issues in 





election. This gave birth to religious intolerance and conflicts 
among the people of Jakarta. Polarization in society has been 
perceived since the protests of Aksi Bela Islam held on 4th  Novem- 
ber and 2nd December 2016, using the easily recognizable taglines 
of #411 and #212. These movements successfully gathered thou- 
sands of Muslims to protest against the government and demand 
punishment for Ahok, who derogatorily cited verses from the 
Qur’an in his speech in the Kepulauan Seribu. 
To understand how this religious intolerance has been re- 
kindled in the present political dynamics, we need to take a 
deeper look at the thesis of the civilizational clash that was 
brought into scholarly discussion by Samuel Huntington in the 
aftermath of the cold war. According to Huntington, the end of 
the cold war was marked by the death of ideologies as political 
doctrines that were born in Western civilization, including the 
ideologies of socialism- communism and liberal capitalism. 
The demise of those ideologies marked a new era in which 
many political ac- tors, political parties and the government 
altered the pattern of political mobilization to gain support 
from the masses through religious and cultural identity 
(Huntington, 1993). Issues of religious intolerance, identity 
politics, and sectarianism have been raised during the 21st 
century. 
In the context of the latest election in Jakarta, sectarian is- 
sues were used by campaign advisors and staff of each candidate 
to mobilize support from the majority of Muslim voters. This 
changed the election of the governor in the capital city of Indo- 
nesia from a contest based on a political program, as happened 
during the 2012 Jakarta Gubernatorial election, to a contestant 
based on religious identities. Therefore, we highlight the fact 
that the chance of the incumbent candidate winning the elec- 
tion by running a campaign based on programmatic issues was 
destroyed by their unwillingness to address religious issues. In 
other words, it was the mistake of Ahok/Djarot themselves as 
the incumbent candidates that spoiled their chance of influenc- 






















Challenging the incumbent in the elections exploited the issue 
of blasphemy to gain electoral support from the majority of 
Mus- lim voters. 
Second, the 2017Jakarta election seemed to break the myth of 
voter behavior in developing countries that has been character- 
ized as highly volatile. A study conducted by Scott Mainwaring 
and Mariano Torcal (2005) became the reference for this case 
because they argue that in developing countries the political par- 
ties tend to have weak political institutions. Political parties in 
developing countries have not been able to strengthen their in- 
stitutional relationship with the voters. On the contrary, the study 
of Mainwaring and Torcal failed to give explanations for the elec- 
tion results in the second round of the Jakarta elections, which 
demonstrateda low level of voter volatility. The outcome of the 
elections demonstrated the capability of two election challeng- 
ing duos (both Agus/Silvy and Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga 
Uno) to consolidate their votes to overthrow the incumbent from 
office. 
This article focuses on two main questions that will be ana- 
lyzed with a view to solving the new puzzle in Indonesian poli- 
tics. First, to what extent was the ideology of voters polarized in 
the second round of the Jakarta Gubernatorial election? Second, 
what was the extent of voters’ volatility during the two rounds of 
the Jakarta Gubernatorial elections? These two questions will be 
answered by revealing data from the National Survey Research 
Group, which conducts surveys and polls intensely in the 
event of elections. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
This paper addresses two main problems as stated above: 
first, the political polarization that formed in the second round 
of the Jakarta elections as indicated by the data from several 
National Survey Groups; second, the extent of voters’ volatility 
during the two rounds of the elections, which lasted from the 






in April. The data will be analyzed using a study case method. 
The data obtained in this study were collected by conducting 
post observation of the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial elections and 
secondary data collection was in the form of journals, books, 
and data surveys by credible National Survey Groups. The 
triangulation method has been applied in this paper, which 
refers to the use of several research methods to test the 
accuracy of data (Babbie, 2010). We checked the validity of data 
presented by several National Survey Groups by comparing them 
to the data from journals and other peer-reviewed materials. 
 
IDEOLOGICAL IDENTITY ANDRELIGIOUS IDENTITY 
One of the most controversial concepts in the history of po- 
litical science is that of ideology. Scholars have also studied the 
concept of ideology in the domain of philosophy of science. 
However, the concept of ideology should be at the center of the 
conceptual framework in political science and must be separated 
from philosophy of science. While in other works, for example 
that of Sartori, ideology is generally classified into two domains, 
i.e., ideology in the domain of science and ideology in the politi- 
cal domain (Giddens, 1983; Sartori, 1979),this article limits the 
notion of ideology to the political domain and we specifically 
address it as the concept of ideological mentality in which indi- 
viduals navigate and orient themselves in the sea of 
politics. Ideology has always been linked in the broader sense 
to an individual’s belief system. The belief system that an 
individual possesses may include, among others, religious, 
philosophical, scientific, political, psychological, and social 
spheres. Thus, specifically in the political realm, ideologism 
refers to a set of beliefs in which individuals direct and orient 
their attitudes and behavior toward the political landscape 
(Sartori, 1979). 
In his scheme of analysis, Sartori classifies the ideology of an 
individual into emotive and cognitive aspects (see Table 1). (a) 
The first element is called fixed ideologism, which is characterized 






















first element of ideologism, an individual’s behavior is highly 
rigid, dogmatic, and closed to, or impenetrable by, other argu- 
ments. (b) The second element is called inelastic ideologism, which 
is characterized by a closed cognitive status but a weak 
emotional state. The second element is cognitively still 
enclosed by argu- ments and evidence but still shows weak 
emotional dynamics and has a tendency to be open to new 
views without traumatic consequences. (c) The third element is 
the characteristic of firm ideologism, which has a tendency to be 
open to arguments and evidence, but is characterized by a 
strong emotive state. And (d) the fourth element is called 
flexible ideologism. This element is characterized by both a weak 
cognitive status and weak emotive status. This fourth element 
is characterized by pragmatism, and openness to arguments 
and evidence, and is easily transformed when confronted by 
other comfort situations. 
 
TABLE 1. SARTORI’S FRAMEWORK OF IDEOLOGY 
 
  
Source: Sartori (2005). 
 
More specifically, the Sartori’s concept of ideology can be clas- 
sified into two major categories:ideologism and pragmatism (see 
Table 2). Sartori describes it in a bipolar dispute scheme, be- 
tween ideologism on the one hand and pragmatism on the other. 
Pragmatism also belongs to the classification of the belief system 
or part of the ideology itself, although it may also mean that an 





the attempt to contrast ideologism and pragmatism represents 
an ideological distance between the strength and weakness of an 
individual’s orientation toward politics. 
 











   
Source: Sartori (1979). Politics, Ideology, and Belief System. Revue européenne des sciences socials. 
 
 
In this work, we use this framework to see the voters’ behav- 
ior during the two rounds of the Jakarta Gubernatorial election. 
More attention can be specifically given to the outcome of the 
second round of the elections, which took place on 19th April. 
But this work does not mean to state that the two candidates 
contesting the elections represented a competition between 
ideologism on the one hand and pragmatism on the other. We shall 
see clearly that the competition between the two candidates rep- 
resents two ideological identity differences, between conserva- 
tive versus liberal and Islamic fundamentalist versus pluralist, or 
even the identity of Islam versus non-Islamic voters. This paper 
seeks to find a proper ideological explanation to show the con- 
trast in ideological doctrines between the two groups of voters. 
Sartori’s scheme is one of the old and fundamental analyses 
in political science. It is mainly used as a tool for identifying the 
ideology of a political party, political institutions, and even indi- 
vidual behavior in a political system. A more recent study to 
explain ideological identity is provided by Tinka Veldhuis and 












home-grown terrorism and radicalization in Western Europe. In 
their research they provide models to show why individuals de- 
cided to take part in Islamic radicalization or ignite certain kinds 
of activism to guard their religious identity. They argue that sev- 
eral macro-level factors that constitute a social context whereby 
an individual interacts in society may ignite ideological transfor- 
mation when it is supported by micro-level factors such as disor- 
ders, pressures, and personal beliefs (Veldhuis&Staun, 2009). 
The argument of Veldhuis and Staun can be explicated in the 
following charts: 
 
FIGURE 1. ROOT CAUSE MODEL OF ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION (VELDHUIS & STAUN, 2009). 
 
 
In this article, we use the framework of Veldhuis and Staun 
to analyze the root of radicalization and religious intolerance 
that prevail during the process of a campaign. In the context of 
the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial election, two major events of 
mass protest to defend Islam (Aksi Bela Islam #411 and #212) 
require some explanation as tohow such movements could pre- 
vail. Both protests occurred as a reaction to the case of Ahok’s 
blas- phemy in Kepulauan Seribu and went viral after being 
uploaded to social media by Buni Yani. We attempt to analyze 






ideological position towards the incumbent candidate in the elec- 
tion. Previously, especially during the first decade after the refor- 
mation era, scholars denoted Indonesian democracy as secular 
democracy with the majority of the Muslim community showing 
tolerance, pragmatism, and commitment to secular nationalism 
(Baswedan, 2004; Mujani, 2009). But current developments have 
contributed to an antipathy towards scholarly analysis of Indo- 
nesian democracy. The events of the Jakarta election may have 
provided initial evidence to support the idea that Indonesian 
democracy is progressing towards illiberal democracy. 
 
CHALLENGE TOTHE STUDY OF MAINWARINGAND TORCAL 
The study by Scott Mainwaring and Mariano Torcal repre- 
sented a strong critique of Sartori’s analysis of polarization in 
the context of political parties. For Mainwaring and Torcal, 
Sartori’s study only explains the context of party systems and 
elections in Western countries. Their major findings consist of 
three basic assumptions. First, the majority of developing coun- 
tries that adopt democratic and semi-democratic systems have a 
higher volatility and more unstable voter character than cases in 
developed countries of the West. Secondly, they further highlight 
the weak institutionalization of party systems in developing coun- 
tries where by political parties are unable to build strong ideo- 
logical roots in the society. Political parties in developing coun- 
tries have not been able to build an ideologically strong relation- 
ship with voters through the offering of programs that are able 
to tie the voters institutionally to the party. 
Third, the relationship between voters and candidates from 
political parties in developing countries has a more personality- 
based character. Voters in developing countries do not vote for 
their candidates based on the ideology and programs their party 
offers. There are many factors underlying the personal relation- 
ship between voters and these candidates, for instance the can- 
didates’ relationships with voters based on their public images 






















The Jakarta Gubernatorial election is a regional landscape in 
Indonesia where Mainwaring and Torcal’s studies on voter vola- 
tility face serious challenges. Jakarta is an electoral district where 
there is a substantial portion of rational voters. A research by 
PUSKAPOL FISIP UI during the 2012electionin Jakarta shows 
that the majority of respondents have a comprehensive knowl- 
edge and understanding of the problems that occurred in Jakarta 
as well as the solutions to them. Competition between candi- 
dates based on programs has a big influence on the choice of 
citizens in Jakarta (Ardiansa, 2014). In other words, the presence 
of a large number of rational voters in Jakarta seems to contra- 
dict Mainwaring and Torcal’s studies about the characteristic of 
voters in developing countries. 
This assumption is also the basis for several major parties (The 
Golkar Party and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) 
and other middle parties (The National Democrat Party) nomi- 
nating the incumbent duo, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama and Djarot 
Saiful Hidayat (Ahok/Djarot), as one of the contestants in the 
2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial election. The political reasoning 
behind this nomination comes from the results of polls from 
various National Survey Groups that indicate that the level of 
public satisfaction with the incumbent’s performance is quite 
high. 
Meanwhile, other parties also have a tendency to nominate 
other candidates who have at least as good an intellectual record 
in order to convince rational voters. The names of candidates 
appearing in election enrollment are based on the criteria of 
educational level, experience in governmental office, having a 
clean image in the case of KKN (Corruption, Collusion, Nepo- 
tism), and leadership capabilities. As a result, two other candi- 
date duos appeared, Agus Harimukti Yudhoyono and Silvy 
(Agus/ Silvy) and Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga 
Uno(Anis/Sandi), to challenge the incumbent. Therefore, these 
candidates were nominated based on their capacities, 






EXPLAININGTHE DEFEAT OF THE INCUMBENT CANDIDATE 
Scholars of political science are surprisingly shocked by the 
incumbent’s performance in the recent Jakarta Gubernatorial 
election, especially with the result showing a wide margin of de- 
feat. Scholarly explanations with regard to the factors behind 
the defeat of Ahok are rarely found. SaifulMujani and William 
Liddle offered a theoretical framework that is frequently cited to 
explain the election and voters’ behavior in Indonesian politics. 
They explain that leadership and party ID were the two most 
important factors of the vote in the legislative elections and presi- 
dential elections held in 1999 and 2004 (Mujani&Liddle, 2007). 
The 2017 election in the capital city of Jakarta provided con- 
trasting facts. It showed that religion and ethnic identities be- 
came the dominant factors behind the incumbent’s defeat in 
the ballots, while leadership character and party ID were comple- 
mentary factors. 
Accordingly we argue that the landslide victory of the elec- 
tion challengers, Anis/Sandi, can be explained by the blunders 
made by the incumbent candidate in applying their political 
marketing strategies. First, the leadership factor, which can be 
classified into a number of characteristics such as public trust 
worthiness, leadership capability, impartiality, assertiveness and 
charisma, intelligence and smartness, hospitality and modesty, 
and personal appeal (SMRC, 2016). In October 2016, 
SaifulMujani Research and Consulting released surveys on the 
popularity and electability of every candidate contesting the 
ballot. They show important findings with regard to leadership 
characteristics in which Ahok scored low on his hospitality 
and modesty (42%), while Agus Harimukti Yudhoyono (72%) 
and Anis Baswedan (80%) scored higher in this variable. In 
contrast, Ahok showed his dominance in five other variables 
compared to other candidates, except the variable of personal 
appeal, which showed fairly commensurable scores. In other 
words, Ahok gained more ad- vantages in appealing to rational 
voters with his remarkable achievements in office. Nonetheless, 






















tal rule in running for gubernatorial elections for a second term. 
He failed to display a good image of his character through harsh 
and vulgar political communications. 
This argument was supported by the verdict of an exit poll 
released by the Indikator Politik, which showed how the voters 
for Agus/Silvy in the first round converted their votes to Anies 
Baswedan and Sandiaga Unoin the second round (see Table 3). 
This shows that the voters for Agus/Silvy had a high degree of 
volatility with 81% of them switching their support to Anis/ 
Sandy. Political commentators have suggested that the reasons 
behind the switching of voters were religious and ethnicity fac- 
tors. 
 




Ahok/Djarotin in the 
second round of the 
election 
Voters for 
Anies/Sandy in the 




Voters’ affiliation to political parties (party ID) 
 
Coalition parties of Agus/Silvy in 1st round of election 19.0 81.0 
PKB 38.0 62.0 
DEMOKRAT 15.0 85.0 
PAN 18.0 82.0 
PPP 11.0 89.0 
Coalition parties of Ahok/Djarotin in 1stround of election 83.0 17.0 
NASDEM 68.0 32.0 
PDIP 90.0 10.0 
GOLKAR 51.0 49.0 
HANURA 48.0 52.0 
Coalition parties of Anies/ Sandy in 1st round of election 6.0 94.0 
PKS 3.0 97.0 
GERINDRA 9.0 91.0 
Nonpartisan voters 39.0 61.0 
 
Source: Data Exit Poll fromIndikatorPolitik April 19th, 2017 
 
 
Second, a further explanation that clarifies Ahok’s defeat is 
religious identity. This identity constitutes a long-established 
social cleavage in Indonesian politics. In the Old Order era, the 
contestation between santri (devout Muslims)andabangan 
(nominal Muslims) dominated Indonesian politics. In a 
previous study based on the data from the 2014 national 





sumed that the battle between santri and abangan became a “freez- 
ing” variable in Indonesian politics and could easily re-emerge 
in the context of local politics (Trihartono & Patriadi, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the use of santri identityis not entirely appropriate 
as the exact definition of this term is a religious student ata 
pesantren or Islamic boarding school. Moreover, there was an ap- 
peal from Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) forbidding their members to 
participate in the movements of #411 and #211 (Tempo Online, 
2016). In this article, we use the dichotomy between santri and 
abangan to address the polarization of identity in the Jakarta elec- 
tion. 
In our view, from the perspective of political marketing, the 
case of blasphemy is a mistake that should have been avoided by 
Ahok. His inability to construct a good personal image gave birth 
to the sentiment of ABA (Asal Bukan Ahok, which literally means 
“as long as it isn’t Ahok”) among the people of Jakarta. Voters 
who emotionally determined their political choice simply by the 
religious factor suddenly decided to cast their votes to figure be- 
side Ahok. Further, this opportunity was exploited by groups of 
Islamic fundamentalists – referring to social institutions that use 
Islam as a conservative ideology – by constructing protests to 
defend Islam (Aksi Bela Islam #411 and #212), and through po- 
litical spin strategies. 
Basically, the case of religious defamation strengthens the ar- 
gument of Jeremy Menchik, who summarizes the data regarding 
Indonesian religious characteristics. For Menchik, Muslim soci- 
ety in Indonesia is a tolerant society but does not place the credo 
of tolerance among liberal perspectives. Tolerance or respect for 
different religious communities is maintained through the au- 
tonomy of each community in matters of Aqidah (theology) and 
Ubudiyah (liturgy), while tolerance can arise within the context 
of Muamalat (social relations). Muslim society in Indonesia does 
not have a unified legal system, hence they put tolerance in so- 
cial relations based on their legal or religious doctrines (Menchik, 






















organizations in Indonesia also agreed that Ahok could not be 
tolerated for his defamations in the area of Aqidah (theology). 
Ahok’s statement, which directly quoted and interpreted the 
verses of the Qur’an according to his belief,was beyond the lim- 
its of tolerance. 
Third, a further aspect is ethnic identity. Ethnicity is one of 
the social cleavage structures that has become another determi- 
nant factor in explaining the local political context in the post- 
Reformation era (Mujani&Liddle, 2007). This ethnic-based so- 
cial cleavage cannot be ignored in the context of local elections, 
including in Jakarta, and was one of the key determinants of 
public preference in previous elections. In the 2008 and 2013 
elections, candidates used the issue of “native Betawi” to drive 
voters’ behavior, but unfortunately this issue was defeated by the 
programmatic campaigns. During the first round of the elections, 
Silvyana used this issue by pointing out that she was the only 
“native Betawi” in the hope of convincing voters in the ballot. 
Ahok and Anis came from nonnative Indonesian origins, but 
during the election this issue wasused for negatively attacking 
the incumbent candidate. 
Ahok’s position as a Chinese ethnic minority became detri- 
mental to his political image. Voters with a large support base 
such as Betawi and Sundanese were more familiar with the 
Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno couple. Other ethnic 
groups such as Chinese and Batak had a strong preference for 
choosing Ahok/Djarot. This analysis is strengthened by the 
data on vot- ers’ distribution based on ethnic identities (see 
Table 4). 
The data on voters’ distribution based on ethnic identity show 
that the society is politically polarized on two aspects of ethnicity. 
One aspect is where the ethnic it of the majority is Muslim 
and has close associations with Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga 
Uno. As seen in the above surveys, the ethnic Betawi, 
Sundanese, and Minang predominantly preferred Anies 
Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno to Ahok-Djarot. We can say that 
Ahok/Djarot has only been successful in attracting Chinese 





TABLE 4. VOTERS’ DISTRIBUTION BASED ON ETHNIC IDENTITIES 
 
Source: Data Exit Poll from IndikatorPolitik held on April 19th, 2017 
 
The results of the Jakarta Gubernatorial election also serve as 
a theoretical reflection of the thesis of Mujani and Liddle, where 
in the regional and local elections the political landscape changed 
to a more localized and personalized contestation. This distin- 
guishes the research of Mujani and Liddle, who took samples of 
national election results in both legislative and presidential elec- 
tions. In this local political context, each candidate’s campaign 
strategy is also getting closer to voters, either in terms of select- 
ing issues or overall political communication strategies. In this 
situation the issues of religion and ethnicity, which reflect the 
personal identity of the majority of voters in Indonesia, are the 
most effective campaign material to drive voter decisions in the 
ballot box. 
 
THE ANOMALY OF AN ELECTORAL WINNINGSTRATEGY 
In general, political consultants formulate their strategy for 
winning an election by targeting three different aspects: the popu- 
larity, acceptability, and electability of their candidate. Further, 
these three aspects were elaborated into four main steps in the 
campaigning process. We can elaborate these four steps simply 
as knowing, being familiar, being acceptable, and casting a vote. 






















introduce the candidate to the public. This strategy is applied 
through the installation of campaign advertising so the public 
know the candidates running for election. Thereafter, campaign 
managers try to make candidates familiar to the public. This 
strategy can be carried out through a canvassing strategy. In the 
recent election for Jakarta Gubernatorial office, every candidate 
usedan impromptu-visits strategy to make them familiar to the 
public as well as rendering their visions, programs, and election 
promises. The third stage is to make candidates acceptable to 
the public. This strategy can be applied by designing programs 
and election promisesthat are favored by the public. Before the 
election day, campaign managers and staff must try to ensure 
that voters are willing to cast their vote for their candidate. This 
crucial stage is hard to measure because voters prefer to keep this 
private and their views will only emerge through the ballot box. 
TABLE 5. PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 
 
Source:Surveys of SMRC held 1st – 9th October 2016. 
 
 
In the case of the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial election, most 
of the surveys released by polling institutions showed that the 
incumbent candidate had a high score on acceptability. Public 
perception of the incumbent’s performance in gubernatorial of- 
fice was high. The data show that 61% of voters in Jakarta were 
satisfied with the performance of Ahok/Djarot (see Table 5). 
This proved that Ahok/Djarot had been successful in tackling 
the city’s problems, although some issues, such as traffic and 





The data are in contrast to the opinion surveys held in the 
2012 Jakarta Gubernatorial election. Opinion surveys released 
by PUSKAPOL FISIP UI show that the public perception of 
government performance is at an average level (Ardiansa, 2012). 
This raises the assumption that once the incumbent has per- 
formed well in office, he has preparedthegroundfor re-election 
for a second term. It also shows linearity with the political mar- 
keting strategy in general that public acceptance oftheincumbent 
candidate could lead to a high possibility of voters casting their 
vote forAhok/Djarot in the ballot box. 
Unfortunately, the election result was contrary to the opin- 
ion survey on the popularity and acceptability rates of Ahok/ 
Djarot. Our explanations forthis failure have been explained in 
the previous section of this article, andare comprised of leader- 
ship characteristics, religious identity, and ethnic identity. 
 
THE FAILURE OF POLITICAL PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
We have seen the data from opinion surveys above that the 
second round of the Jakarta Gubernatorial election caused deep 
friction among the public in Jakarta. That impact also spreadto 
many provinces outside Jakarta. This also strengthens the view 
that Jakarta is one of the important benchmarksin Indonesian 
politics. On the one hand, after the election, the president sud- 
denly dissolved the HizbutTahrir Indonesia (HTI), a decision that 
in our opinion was made due to the growing polarization be- 
tween the citizens. On the other hand, the Jakarta High Court 
sentenced Ahokto two years for blasphemy against Islam. The 
government’s verdict post election seemed to underline the ef- 
fort to curb deep polarizations among the society. 
Chris Chaplin, one of KITLV’s researchers, performed an 
interesting analysis of the dynamics of the Jakarta election. He 
pointed out that the emergence of Islamic conservatism is a prod- 
uct of the temporary alliance between Islamic intellectuals and 
politicians. Furthermore, he wrote that the alliance was only able 






















during thee. It did not represent an alliance of ideologiesthatis 
deep-rooted in society (Asia and The Pacific Policy Society online, 
2017). Unfortunately, Chaplin’s analysis is not supported by 
strong data analysis. 
In our view, Chaplin seems to argue that the dynamics that 
occurred during the Jakarta election was not ideological polar- 
ization, which resulted from the competition between political 
parties. In this case, Chaplin has the same viewas Mainwaring 
and Torcal (2005), who stated that political parties in the devel- 
oping countries were still unable to establish strong institutional 
relations with the voters. Therefore, the switching electoral sup- 
port from Agus/Silvy in the first round of the election to 
AniesBaswedan and Sandiaga Uno in the second round was not 
the result of their supporting political party strategy. To support 
this argument, we can refer to opinion surveys data from the 
IndikatorPolitikon the relation between voters and their party’s 
preference, commonly known as Party ID (see Table 5). 
 
TABLE 6. OPINION SURVEYS ON PARTY ID IN JAKARTA 
 
Source: Opinion Surveys of IndikatorPolitik held 12th– 20th January 2017 
 
 
These findings indicate the weakness of political parties in 
constructing their ideological roots with voters, especially in 





cated by the low survey result, whichshows that only 7.8% of the 
public revealed their party preference. The topfivein surveys were 
PDIP, PKS, Demokrat, Gerindra, and PPP. The high percentage 
of people who say that they do not have any particular prefer- 
ence for any political party (80.4%) strengthens Mainwaring and 
Torcal’s view that political parties in developing countries are 
incapable of building an ideological relationship with their vot- 
ers. 
However, we still argue that the Jakarta election showed a 
certain degree of ideological polarization. In the midst of the 
situation where the political parties were unable to establish an 
ideological relation with the people, their role was replaced by 
an ideological movement established by various Islamic organi- 
zations, such as NahdlatulUlama (NU), Muhammadiyah, Front 
Pembela Islam (FPI), Gerakan National Pembela Fatwa MajelisUlama 
Indonesia (GNPF MUI), HizbutTahrir Indonesia (HTI), 
MajelisIntelektual Muda Indonesia (MIUMI) etc. These Muslim- 
based organizations took over the political parties’ roles in con- 
solidating the people’s political preferences. Polarization also 
occurredamong these organizations, with some of the organiza- 
tions promoting Islamic moderation and others promoting Is- 
lamic conservatism. 
 
IDEOLOGY BEHINDVOTERS’POLITICAL PREFERENCES 
The explanation above has shown that the political process 
in Jakarta affects polarization within the society both at the local 
and nationwide level. It is also mentioned above that this 
paper aims to analyze the ideological distance that emerged 
during the contestation in the Jakarta election. Therefore, we 
shall identify ideologies that existed during the contestation. 
This can be traced from a series of events during the election, 
starting from the announcement of candidates, to the first 
round of the election, and then to the second round of the 
election. It can be analyzed by tracking campaign materials, 
political marketing strategies, and all political maneuvers by the 






















volunteers to party elites, as well as community leaders who were 
actively involved in the Jakarta election. 
Everything seemed positive for Ahok before a video contain- 
ing his speech was posted on Facebook by BuniYani on 6th Octo- 
ber 2016. Thereupon, a blasphemy issue spread rapidly on social 
media around a statement made by Ahok who blatantly cited 
from Al Qur’an, Surah Al Maidah, verse 51, in Kepulauan Seribu 
on 27th September 2016. This brought a serious challenge to 
the incumbent candidate because it coincided with the 
candidates’ verification period. Ahok’s speech in Kepulauan 
Seribu was sui- cidal in terms of his image and was soon being 
exploited as an effective weapon by his political opponents. 
This issue was also exploited by his political opponents in 
building a mass move- ment that united Indonesian Muslims 
over the issue of imprisonment for Ahok. In the midst of the 
blasphemy issue, Ahok’s staff released a pocket book entitled 7 
Dalil Umat Isam DKI dalam Memilih Gubernur in an attempt to 
justify why the public should vote for Ahok (see Picture 6). 
Instead of gaining support, the book was misused by the 
Islamic fundamentalist groups who released a counter book 
entitled Haram Memilih Pemimpin Non-Muslim (see Picture 6). 
 
 





The Al Maidah case paved the way for the emergence of Anti- 
Ahok movements and black campaign issues attackingAhok’s 
personal image. The spread of these two campaign books to the 
people of Jakarta strengthened the voters’ ideological position. 
We can see from the perspective of political marketing that the 
biggest mistake made by Ahokwas bringing the religious issue to 
the fore, while at the same time not successfully bringing out 




FIGURE 3. PAMPHLETS CONTAINING RELIGIOUS ISSUES. 
 
The publication of two contrasting campaign books in the 
Jakarta election correlates to the study of Colm Fox and Jeremy 
Menchik (2011), which explains why campaigning through vari- 
ous religious posters can effectively alter the political preference 
of voters (see Pictures 6 and 7). According to their research, a 
largenumber of religious symbols were used during the campaign 
in Jakarta. From the total amount of campaign materials col- 
lected from Jakarta, 32% of the tools are religious symbols and 
put Jakarta in third place after Aceh (36%) and South Borneo 
(43%). Fox and Menchik provide three important answers to 






















it wasdue to the existence of a university, which has becomea 
fertile camp for the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in 
Indonesia over the past two decades. Second, the majority of 
Indonesia’s younger generations are more religious than the older 
generations and the urban areas have more young populations. 
Third, most urban communities are not bound by regional iden- 
tity, so they become more affiliated with religious identity (Fox 
&Menchik, 2011). 
Interestingly, we can settle an argument by saying that there 
was a similar strategy among all the candidates participating in 
the election, and that they all brought the religious issue to the 
forefront. Nevertheless, there were substantial differences in how 
they framed the religious issue to the public. On the one hand, 
Ahok/Djarot’s campaign staff tried to dismiss the non-Muslim 
issues by presenting arguments such as tolerance, pluralism, de- 
mocracy, and justice. In fact, they presented toleration as their 
ideological content in the campaign, which in our opinion can 
be categorized as Islamic moderation. On the other hand, both 
Agus/Sylvi and Anis-Sandi had a common strategy, which was 
trying to dismiss the notion that indigenous Muslim people could 
vote for non-Muslim and nonindigenous leaders. In this regard, 
they presented a political marketing strategy that shaded conser- 
vative ideology. 
Coinciding with the ideological consolidation of moderate 
Islamic organizations that representedAhok/Djarot issues, mas- 
sive mass movements emerged to beat the negligence of Ahok’s 
political marketing strategy. It gave birth to the indigenous Indo- 
nesian Muslim movements both in the form of populismand 
conser vatism, initiated by AksiBela Islam #411, which 
demandedthat the government punishedAhok for blasphemy. 
This movement was followed by thousands of people from Jakarta 
and other cities. After the protestof December 12th, a massive 
movement returned with a larger number of participants, both 
from inner and outer Jakarta, in the name of AksiBela Islam #212. 





by Islamic intellectual figures who were members of several mass 
organizations such as FPI, GNPF-MUI, HTI, Muhammadiyah, 
NU, and other organizations affiliated with them. 
The blasphemy case led to the emergence of religiously de- 
fended acts both in the form of mass movements and also hate 
campaigns on social media. Their participation in AksiBela Is- 
lam#411 and #212was essentially in line with one of the Islamic 
principles, i.e.,Hirastuaddinwasiyasatuaddunya, which means guard- 
ing the religion and managing worldly things (Menchik, 2014). 
 
APPLYINGTHE ROOT CAUSE MODEL 
The most recent theoretical framework in understanding Is- 
lamic radicalization came upon the analysis of an “embedded 
individual” and left a stage model of analysis behind. In their 
analysis, Veldhuis and Staun postulate a notion that radicalization 
occurs due to an individual process that can be understood in 
connection with the individual’s social environment. They 
avoided a stage model in understanding Islamic radicalization, a 
model that is commonly used by government in a deradicalization 
program and counter-terrorism strategy (Veldhuis&Staun, 
2009). The religiously defended acts of #212 and #411 can 
certainly be categorized as Islamic radicalization, although these 
movements did not lead to violence. Violence is the climax of 
the radicalization process. Individuals may decide to take part 
in violence, protests, and other unlawful behavior when 
mitigated by the issue that threatens their identity. Both 
movements undoubtedly emerged due to intense political 
dynamics in the election. 
The root cause model is based on the context of home-grown 
terrorism and Islamic radicalization in Europe. To apply this 
theory to the context of the Jakarta election, we need to exam- 
ine the social dynamics in the election, which in the root cause 
model is referred to as macro-level analysis. In this paper, we 
find that the events of the Jakarta election produced extremely 
vigorous social and political dynamics that were manufactured 






















ticians, religious leaders, academics, social activists, etc. We can 
classify the social issues that occurred in the Jakarta election by 
applying the root cause model. It can be categorized into macro- 
level units of analysis as follows: 
 
TABLE 7. MACRO-LEVEL FACTORS OCCURRING IN THE JAKARTA ELECTION 
 
MACRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS SEVERAL FACTS OCCUR DURING ELECTION 
 
  
Social and economic discrimination  Issues of economic gap between indigenous 
people versus nonindigenous (Chinese) 
 Government policy to relocate inhabitants of 
riverbanks of Jakarta. 
 Reclamation policy of Jakarta bay 
 
  
Poor integration  Social segregation 
 Ethnic identity issues 
Perceived war against “Islam”  Ahok’s blasphemous statement 
  
Influences of media, peers, imams, 
family members 
 Campaign materials containing religious symbol 
 Hate speech from religious leaders and politicians 
in mosques 




Source: THE Author’s documentation based on Veldhuis and Staun’s Model: 
 
TABLE 8. PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF AHOK’S BLASPHEMOUS STATEMENT 










Insulting Religion or Not     
Ahok’s statement 
insulting religion 
57.3 27.1 16.2 51.4 5.2 
Ahok’s statement not 
insulting religion 
27.4 6.4 83.2 9.8 0.6 
No idea or no 15.2 19.5 40.9 27.0 12.6 
response      
 
Source: Opinion surveys of IndikatorPolitik held 2nd – 8th February 2017 
 
 
Among the many issues mentioned above, Ahok’s blasphe- 
mous statement became the center of attention and we consid- 
ered it to be the fundamental factor behind his poor performance 
in the second round of the election. The public perception of 





his popularity (see Table 6). We consider blasphemy issues to be 
the triggering factors that give birth to the revival of religious 
identity in elections. 
Statistical data show that Ahok’s statement in Kepulauan 
Seribu received a negative response from voters. The data were 
collected from surveys held a few weeks before the first round 
of the election. They indicated that 57.3% of the public 
expressed their views that Ahok despised Qur’anic verses. 
Meanwhile, the data illustrated that only 27.4% of the public 
disagreed with the allegations of blasphemy and another 15.2% 
refused to give answers to such a question. These facts are in 
line with the outcome of the first round of the election in 
which Ahok failed to realize his positive achievements in going 
from incumbent to decisive victory in the first round of the 
election. 
In brief, we can clarify that the ideological identity behind 
the mass movements of #411 and #211 was the identity of Mus- 
lims who confronted the threat to their religion to achieve a 
de- sired social state. Veldhuis and Staun mentioned in their 
analysis several factors that became the micro level of analysis of 
individuals. Those factors included psychological disorder and 
strained personal experiences, persona beliefs, favoritism for the 
in group community, and humiliation in public life. 
Accordingly, we argue that the religious identity of the 
majority of Muslim voters in Jakarta is the strongest evidence for 
the micro-level analysis presented in this article. Religious 
identity is part of the “embedded” identity of the voters. This 
identity constitutes “ anendogenous” identity and has been 
able to convince voters to transform their ideological stance 
toward the incumbent candidate. We took as an example the 
behavior of supporters of Agus/Silvy, where in the first round 
of the elections this candidate collected 17% of the votes. In 
the second round, they switched their votes to Anies Baswedan 
and Sandiaga Uno. More- over, there are other micro-level 
factors such as ethnic identities, economic deprivation, 
relocation, and reclamation policy that affected deeply the 






















Jakarta. But we could not provide convincing data to settle the 
argument. One important finding has emerged from this re- 
search: that religious identity could seriously challenge the de- 
velopment of Indonesian democracy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial election is over, but it still 
leaves many questions as to whether the political construction 
in the capital territory of Indonesia can affect the contestation 
of elections in other provinces and regencies outside Jakarta. 
Some scholars in political science have appreciated, sarcastically 
satirized, or even rejected the victory of Anies Baswedan and 
Sandiaga Uno in the Jakarta gubernatorial election. But the fact 
of the matter is that it shows how religious identity may still exist 
as one of the most important cleavage structures in Indonesian 
politics. It has been considered a “freezing” cleavage and returns 
to the stage in contestations between santri and abangan. 
We can underline that polarization of voters both politically 
and ideologically became keys to Anies Baswedan and 
Sandiaga Uno’s victory. The evidence of political polarization can 
be clearly seen in the behavior of rational voters who did not 
favor the public image of Ahok. It came from the supporters of 
Agus/ Silvy in the first round of the election who thus 
switched their support to Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno 
in the second round. They clearly did not see the figure of 
Ahok as politically representing them. Meanwhile, the 
evidence of ideologically polarized voters was imminent on 
those who were compelled not to vote for Ahok due to his 
blasphemy against Islam. Ahok’s statement (Al-Maidah 51) 
became a stimulant for these voters to further strengthen their 
ideological standing so as not to vote for candidates who had 
violated religious faith in the election. This was evidenced from 
Aksi Bela Islam#411, #212, and other political mobilizations 
during the election. The movement also showed signs that the 






One could argue that the blasphemy incident was politically 
hijacked by political parties, interest groups, political elites, or 
even religious leaders. Actually, if we look at the people’s reac- 
tion in the Aksi Bela Islam of #212 and #411, we can infer that 
those who participated in the religious movement, most of their 
reasons were always ideological. It was simply because they could 
not tolerate any political figures who insulted their faith or ide- 
ology. 
Polarization of voters occurred due to the presence of reli- 
gious blasphemy issues raised by Ahok and his campaign staff 
andwas maintained from the registration of candidates until the 
second round of the elections. Some alleged that the main fac- 
tor behind Ahok’s defeat was his own inability to portray a good 
image in political communication. On the other hand, the cam- 
paign advisor and staff of two other candidates were accused of 
excessively exploiting religious issues in the election. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The impacts of the Jakarta election were not only at the pro- 
vincial level but could bring serious conflict and the spread of 
intolerance to other areas outside Jakarta. They could lead to 
nationwide issues for the central government, which is facing 
the agenda of “Pilkada Serentak” in 2018 and “Pemilu 
Serentak” in 2019. However, the question of whether the 
Jakarta election will be a model for elections in other 
provinces and regencies requires further research, bearing in 
mind the fact that every region in Indonesia has unique 
characteristics with a certain level of differences in the nature of 
political systems, social systems, and cultural systems. Further 
researches are also needed to ad- dress the question of whether 
Indonesian politics have advanced towards illiberal democracy. 
Many scholars have begun such projects and have come to the 
conclusion that Indonesian democracy is under threat of 
growing intolerance, massive corruption by government 
officials at the national and local level, weak institutionalism of 






















on religion and ethnic identity, etc. 
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